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APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF FREE EXERCISE CASES
Caleb C. Wolanek* & Heidi Liu**
ABSTRACT
Strict scrutiny and the free exercise of religion have had an uneasy
relationship in American jurisprudence. In this Article, we trace the history
of strict scrutiny in free exercise cases and outline how it applies today.
Then, using a unique dataset of cases from a 25-year period, we detail the
characteristics of these cases. Finally, we discuss the implications for future
cases. Our research indicates that even though claimants currently win a
large percentage of cases, those victories might not be durable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Strict scrutiny is relatively simple in theory: it is a balancing test with a
thumb on the scales.1 The balancing aspect asks whether the asserted gov-
ernment interest is so compelling as to demand that individual liberty take a
back seat. If the government interest is strong enough, the next question is
whether the government could achieve its interest without burdening liberty
as much. If not, the regulation survives.2
Yet applying this test raises complex issues. What is a compelling in-
terest? Just how compelling, and how specific, must that interest be? At
what point does accommodation become so difficult to implement, or so
* J.D. 2017, Harvard Law School; B.A. 2014, Auburn University (Political Science).
** Ph.D. Student, Harvard Kennedy School (Public Policy); J.D. 2017, Harvard Law School; B.A.
2011, Harvard College (Economics).
We contributed equally to this Article. Professor Adam Winkler and Michael Francus provided
valuable insight for which we are profoundly grateful. Of course, any remaining errors are our own.
1. Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional
Law, 84 IND. L. J. 917, 919 (2009). This characterization may not apply in other contexts. According to
Professor Fallon, there are three interpretations of strict scrutiny: a “nearly categorical prohibition”; a
“weighted balancing test”; and an “‘illicit motives’ test, aimed at ‘smoking out’ forbidden government
purposes.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1302–03 (2007). But
at least in the free exercise context, strict scrutiny essentially equals balancing.
2. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115–18 (1991)). For the history of strict scrutiny, see Fallon, supra note 1, at 1273–85, R
1297–1302; Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory, Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798–801, 805–09 (2006).
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frustrate the government’s interests, that no accommodation is required?3 In
Employment Division v. Smith,4 the Supreme Court said judges could not
resolve these questions when religious liberty was at issue. The Court was
concerned that attempting to resolve them would create a “private right to
ignore generally applicable laws,”5 and it therefore held that free exercise
cases did not receive strict scrutiny. But within a few years, strict scrutiny
was again required in a large number of cases.
This Article examines whether reinstating strict scrutiny created a “pri-
vate right to ignore generally applicable laws,” or whether that perennial
concern is exaggerated.6 Put differently, we ask when the government can
prevail against religious liberty claimants in a strict scrutiny regime. This
Article answers these questions in a comprehensive, empirical manner. Us-
ing an original data set of 264 federal cases, we coded each case from 1990
to 2015 that applied strict scrutiny and statistically analyzed the entire set.
Ultimately, strict scrutiny is strict but complicated.
After this Introduction, Parts II and III recount the history of strict
scrutiny in the free exercise context and describe how courts apply strict
scrutiny. Those sections place the empirical results in context. Using an
original dataset of cases, Part IV empirically analyzes strict scrutiny free
exercise cases. Part V concludes.
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Religious liberty was important to many Framers,7 so it is no surprise
that they protected the “free exercise of religion.”8 But “free exercise” is
not completely self-defining. Despite best efforts, scholars and judges alike
have found its original meaning elusive.9 More specifically, although it is
3. These questions describe the nature of our society. Cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
254 (3d ed. 2007) (“The nature of any society . . . is not to be deciphered from its laws alone, but from
those understood as an index of its conflicts.”).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 885–86 (1990).
5. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
6. See Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285, 298 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (“No academic or judicial discus-
sion of the compelling-interest test ever seems complete without some reference to a likely parade of
horribles. . . . But such hypothetical claims seem less scary when one realizes that they are rarely
brought and do not win.”); Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and
Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 373–75 (2010).
7. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments ¶ 1
(June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 10 MARCH 1784–28 MARCH 1786, at 295, 299
(Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachel eds., 1973); Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 16 (June 12,
1776), in 1 KATE M. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–1792, at 438, 441 (1892).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (incor-
porating the Free Exercise Clause to the states).
9. Some believe the free exercise clause was intended to protect exemptions from neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
2
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commonly accepted that “targeting religious beliefs as such is never per-
missible,”10 there is great disagreement about whether (and to what extent)
the Constitution protects the right to act on those beliefs. In Reynolds v.
United States,11 the Court held that the Constitution protected beliefs, but
not practices. Otherwise, the Court feared, one might “become a law unto
himself.”12 But this strict distinction between belief and practice is both
dangerous and impractical— religious belief often involves action. We are
therefore fortunate the Court never carried the distinction to its logical con-
clusion that religious actions are not protected. But at the same time, Reyn-
olds’s central concern is valid: some restriction on religious practice is
needed. At some point, the law must separate permissible from impermissi-
ble religious action.13 This is true despite the text of the Free Exercise
Clause14; our legal system has not adopted Justice Hugo Black’s First
Amendment absolutism.15
When religious liberty cases re-emerged some years after Reynolds,
the Court (consistent with Reynolds’s concerns) applied a relatively low
level of scrutiny. In Braunfeld v. Brown,16 for instance, a plurality held that
(concluding “the Free Exercise Clause is properly understood as an affirmative guarantee” of religious
exemptions); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1511–12 (1990) (arguing a right to exemptions “is more consistent
with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation.”);
see also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1156 (1994) (arguing “the original intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment” allows religious claimants to seek “exemption from the unjusti-
fied impact of generally applicable law.”). Others, however, respond that neutral, generally applicable
laws satisfy the First Amendment’s demands. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part) (responding that the better reading of history was that no exemption from neutral, generally
applicable laws is required); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 948 (1992) (same).
10. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)
(citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality)).
11. 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
12. Id. at 167.
13. Id. at 166 (positing human sacrifice as an example of impermissible religious action); see also
Davı´d Carrasco, Human Sacrifice: Aztec Rites, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 4185, 4187 (Lindsay
Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005) (describing an Aztec human sacrifice ritual). Professor Amar raises an interest-
ing question: what if those being sacrificed consented to the ritual? See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 256 n.100 (1998). But as Professor Volokh reminds us, there are often government interests in
preventing so-called “voluntary” actions. Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemp-
tions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 625–28 (1999) (describing legal
interests in guarding against irreversible choices, pressured choices, and negative externalities).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(incorporating the First Amendment to the states).
15. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . .
abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”) (free speech case); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 865, 874–76 (1960).
16. 366 U.S. 599, 605–09 (1961) (plurality).
3
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because Sunday closing laws were generally applicable (and not covertly
aimed at religion), were within state power, and were reasonable, they did
not violate Jewish shopkeepers’ right to religious freedom. This was true
even though the laws required the shopkeepers to close on both Saturday
(for the Sabbath) and Sunday (to comply with the statute).17 Quite unlike
Reynolds, however, the Court’s opinion in Cantwell v. Connecticut18 said
that government could not “unduly” burden religious activity. Although
government could regulate the time, place, and manner of preaching, it
could not “wholly deny the right to preach” or condition religious speech on
an individualized assessment of its content.19 To be sure, Cantwell overlaps
significantly with the Free Speech Clause, but the Court itself reached its
decision under the Free Exercise Clause.20
Justice Brennan dissented in Braunfeld, arguing that strict scrutiny
should apply because religion is a fundamental right.21 His wish was
granted in 1963, when Sherbert v. Verner22 said religious burdens had to be
justified by reference to a “paramount interest” advanced via the least re-
strictive means—that is, under a strict scrutiny standard. The height of
Sherbert-style strict scrutiny was Wisconsin v. Yoder,23 where the Court
exempted the Old Order Amish from compulsory education laws. To be
sure, religious claimants did not always win during the so-called “Sherbert-
era.” Instead, it is generally accepted that courts actually applied something
akin to intermediate scrutiny.24 The Court also exempted two significant
sectors (prisons and the military) from strict scrutiny altogether.25 Still,
from a doctrinal standpoint, strict scrutiny was required.
17. Id. at 606–09.
18. 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
19. Id. at 304.
20. Id. at 303–04.
21. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 612–14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 175 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
22. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See also Fallon, supra note 1, at 1281 (stating Sherbert “does not R
employ the precise language now associated with strict scrutiny, but it includes the modem test’s central
conceptual elements.”). For a discussion of Sherbert’s relationship to earlier cases, compare LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1255 (2d ed. 1988) (finding continuity between Sherbert
and earlier cases), with Jesse H. Choper, The Rise & Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Relig-
ious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 655 (1991) (finding discontinuity).
23. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); see also, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136,
141–42 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 259 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713–14 (1981).
24. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE 178 (2010); TRIBE, supra note 22, at 1261–62; R
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1500 n.106
(1999) (collecting authorities).
25. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (prisons); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (military).
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol78/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-AUG-17 8:24
2017 APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY 279
But in 1990, the Court in Employment Division v. Smith26 said that
heightened scrutiny—whether strict or intermediate—was not required
when a neutral and generally applicable law burdened religious exercise.
The majority’s core concern echoed Reynolds: requiring the government to
demonstrate a compelling interest advanced through the least restrictive
means would permit each citizen “to become a law unto himself.”27 Given
America’s religious pluralism, requiring exemptions “would be courting an-
archy.”28 To top it off, the Court said weighing government interests against
religious liberty was a task ill-suited for judges.29 The Court thus swept
Sherbert aside, stating it only applied when there was an “individualized . . .
assessment” of religious conduct.30
Smith was not the final word, however. Both Congress and the Court
have since required judges to apply strict scrutiny in a significant number of
cases. Although Congress cannot “overturn” Smith, it created statutory pro-
tections for religious liberty.31 Congressional action first came through the
almost unanimously enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA),32 which expressly brought back the rule articulated in Sherbert v.
26. 494 U.S. at 885. Smith did not specify whether rational basis would apply instead of strict
scrutiny, but lower courts have almost unquestioningly interpreted Smith as applying rational basis. See,
e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1999).
27. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
28. Id. at 888; see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi & the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 853 (2001) (“[Smith]
appears to have been determined by a formula that can be stated as follows: Religious Pluralism plus
Religious Liberty equals Anarchy.”).
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889; see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 743, 759 (1992) (describing one of Smith’s “central objectives” as “freeing courts from the federal
constitutional obligation to weigh state interests against the impact upon religion worked by state poli-
cies.”); see also Volokh, Religious Exemptions, supra note 24, at 1521–29, 1565 (noting connection to R
substantive due process). Along these lines, Professor Smith postulates that “the low win percentage for
religious objectors [during the Sherbert era] might be the product of two factors: (a) the fact that demo-
cratic legislatures had already acquired the habit of trying to accommodate religious minorities; and (b)
the deference that courts properly pay to judgments by other, more electorally accountable branches. . . .
And so it might seem that the repudiation of the Sherbert doctrine in Smith represented no great loss.”
Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and its Enemies, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033, 2042 (2011).
30. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. This distinction blends into the Court’s Lukumi decision. See infra notes
81–89 and accompanying text; Duncan, supra note 28, at 860–61, 882. The Court also said Sherbert R
was limited to the unemployment context, Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, but this was almost certainly an
incorrect reading of Sherbert, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism & the Smith Deci-
sion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122–23 (1990).
31. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–29 (defining Congress’s powers under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
32. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4). For a
historical account of RFRA’s passage, see generally Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffmann, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531 (1993).
5
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Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.33 RFRA still applies to the federal govern-
ment,34 and many states have adopted similar statutes.35 In 1997, City of
Boerne v. Flores36 struck down the federal RFRA as applied to the states,
holding it exceeded Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress responded by unanimously enacting the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).37 RLUIPA
requires states to apply strict scrutiny if a land use or institutional regulation
burdens religious beliefs.38 And to avoid a repeat of Boerne, Congress
passed RLUIPA under both the Commerce Clause39 and the Spending
Clause.40 Though RLUIPA is narrower than RFRA, the two statutes to-
gether require strict scrutiny in a large number of cases.41
Unlike Congress, the Court actually can change how Smith operates.
And in 1993, the Court held that Smith only applies if the challenged regu-
lation is both neutral and generally applicable.42 This means judges must
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012); see also S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 7–8 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897–98.
34. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) (applying RFRA);
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) (applying RFRA
even though it “was not required as a matter of constitutional law.”).
35. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L. CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Oct. 15, 2015)
(collecting statutes), perma.cc/SWU8-R8UM. But cf. generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty
After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010) (noting multiple problems with
state RFRAs). Some states also impose strict scrutiny as a matter of state constitutional law. See Kara
Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception: A Partial Account of Hobby
Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 104 n.75 (2015) (collecting cases).
36. 521 U.S. at 529–36.
37. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5). See
Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1021–41 (2012) (overviewing the history of, and need for, RLUIPA); David W.
Dunlap, God, Caesar & Zoning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, at RE1. Cutter v. Wilkinson upheld
RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge. 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2012) (land use regulation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012) (prisons).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(b)(2), 2000cc-1(b)(2) (2012). The Second Circuit has affirmed RLUIPA
against an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
504 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2007). Most circuits have avoided this question. See, e.g., Smith v. Allen,
502 F.3d 1255, 1274 n.9 (11th Cir. 2007) (doubting Commerce Clause applicability); Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (not reaching the question).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(b)(1), 2000cc-1(b)(1) (2012). Several lower courts have upheld RLUIPA
under the Spending Clause. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 328 n.34 (5th
Cir. 2009); Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 2006).
41. RLUIPA only applies in two contexts: land use regulations and institutionalized persons (e.g.,
prisons). RFRA, by contrast, applies to all federal government actions. Together, they cover a large (but
unknown) percentage of religious liberty claims.
42. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531. Smith implied these limits, 494 U.S. at 879–91, but Lukumi brought
them to the fore and dispelled any doubt as to their existence. Those doubts were not unfounded given
that Smith cited the Lukumi district court opinion as an example of religious claimants seeking an imper-
missible exemption. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (citing Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723
F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
6
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look closely at the statute to uncover any religious discrimination.43 If dis-
crimination is found, strict scrutiny applies.44 Even after Smith then, strict
scrutiny exists in many (if not most) religious liberty cases. How courts
apply that doctrine is our next inquiry.
III. STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIED
Religious claimants prevail under the Free Exercise Clause if they
demonstrate that there is a substantial burden on their religious beliefs, if
they can invoke strict scrutiny,45 and if the government cannot demonstrate
both a compelling interest and least restrictive means.46 Conversely, the
government wins if it shows that it has a compelling government interest
furthered through the least restrictive means, or if the claimant cannot
demonstrate either a substantial burden or grounds (statutory or otherwise)
for applying strict scrutiny.
A. Substantial Burden
The Free Exercise Clause only bars government actions that coerce
someone47 into violating her sincere religious beliefs.48 For better or for
43. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
44. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
45. The religious claimant must demonstrate the existence of a substantial burden. Navajo Nation v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428 (noting
church met the burden); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384–85,
389–92 (1990) (holding religious claimants had not demonstrated a substantial burden).
If RFRA or RLUIPA applies, the government must meet strict scrutiny. If neither applies, Lukumi
allows the policy to survive if it is neutral and generally applicable. Some lower courts seem to place the
burden of proving neutrality or generality on religious claimants. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794
F.3d 1064, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
653 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (placing burden on plaintiff in
political gerrymandering cases). But the Second Circuit treats neutrality and generality as a defense,
meaning the government must justify imposing the burden by pointing to a neutral and generally appli-
cable law. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., 293 F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 2002); cf.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing grant of summary judgment
for government, remanding for government to establish generality and neutrality). In the end, this ambi-
guity is inconsequential: most courts simply review the facts for themselves without discussing the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–46; Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir.
2012); Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.).
46. The government bears the burden of proof here. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(c), 2000cc(a)(1),
2000cc-1(a) (2012); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
47. RFRA protects corporations. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. For a discussion of corpo-
rate religious liberty, see generally THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman
et al. eds., 2016). Hobby Lobby did not address whether the Constitution also protects corporations.
48. Religious beliefs are not determined by referencing theological texts. Instead, the Court asks
whether the beliefs are sincerely held and subjectively religious. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
85–88 (1944).
7
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worse, it is not enough for government action to make religious exercise
more difficult—such as when the government builds a road through a Na-
tional Forest, incidentally making it more difficult for Native Americans to
worship there.49 There must instead be a forced choice between (1) exercis-
ing one’s religion and (2) avoiding punishment or securing government
benefits.50 For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, there was a forced choice
between working on Saturday and receiving unemployment benefits.51 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the choice was between preserving Amish culture and
paying a $5 fine.52 For a Jewish inmate, the choice might be between keep-
ing Kosher (but starving) and eating unclean foods.53
Moreover, this burden must be “substantial.”54 But which half of the
choice must be substantial: the hindrance to religious free exercise or the
penalty? Even before Smith, Professor Ira Lupu noted this distinction,55 but
the Court has not fully resolved the issue. Sometimes the Court looks at the
spiritual harm that comes after one violates a religious commandment, just
as the Court did in Wisconsin v. Yoder.56 But other times, it appears to look
at the penalty imposed or the benefit withheld. For example, in Hernandez
v. Commissioner,57 the Church of Scientology argued it should receive tax
deductions for its “auditing” fees because paying taxes made its ministry
49. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); see also
Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a
RFRA claim where the claimants could not demonstrate the presence of a forced choice).
50. These requirements need not be in the criminal code; requirements for optional benefits count
for these purposes. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404–05 & n.6; see also
William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right–Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1446 & n.26 (1968) (citing Sherbert as one of many cases breaking down the
right-privilege distinction).
51. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
52. 406 U.S. at 208–09.
53. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Shilling v. Crawford, 536
F. Supp. 2d. 1227, 1233 (D. Nev. 2008) (conditioning receiving Kosher meals on being transferred to a
higher security facility).
54. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391–92; Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (citing Hob-
bie, 480 U.S. at 141–42; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–19; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220–21).
55. Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on The Free Exercise of Religion, 102
HARV. L. REV. 933, 961 (1989) (distinguishing the “coercion theory” from the “substantial impact”
theory of burdens); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens of Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1213 (1996) (“[N]either Sherbert nor Yoder gives a satisfactory explanation of the substantiality
threshold of RFRA.”).
56. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (“[Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance law] carries with it precisely
the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to
prevent. As the record shows, [the law] carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated
into society at large or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.”). But see Navajo
Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (arguing that “the undue
burden [in Yoder] was the penalty of criminal sanctions on the parents for refusing to enroll their chil-
dren in such school.”).
57. 490 U.S. at 699.
8
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economically more difficult. Under a Yoder-style approach, the Court
would have briskly stated that because there was no theological objection,
there was no burden on free exercise. But the Court instead went on to
consider whether the tax actually pressured the Church or its members by
reducing the amount of funds available for religious use.58 It suggested that
the answer was no, and it affirmed that principle three years later in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization: “to the extent that imposition
of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money appel-
lant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitu-
tionally significant.”59 This rule makes clear that the burden is pressure im-
posed via the decrease in funds—not the religious consequences incurred
by paying the tax.60
Yoder and Hernandez present distinct approaches. Frustratingly, how-
ever, the Court often cites both the Yoder and the Hernandez conceptions of
substantial burden.61 Doctrinally, the better approach is to follow Her-
nandez and Jimmy Swaggart by looking at the cost of noncompliance.62
This means a law might so impede religious exercise that it violates the
Constitution even if that religious belief is not central to or mandated by the
religion. This is what several lower courts have done,63 and for good rea-
son. First, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n64 requires that
there be some element of coercion. If there is no penalty for noncompliance,
there is no coercion. Second, following Yoder’s approach requires looking
into religious beliefs. Because even idiosyncratic religious beliefs are pro-
tected,65 this inquiry is doomed from the start.66 Quite simply, the Court is
58. Id.
59. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391.
60.  True, in Hernandez and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries there was no theological objection. See id.
at 391–92 (also stating that Sherbert did not apply because there was no religious-based objection);
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699. But the critical lesson to learn from Hernandez and Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries is that the court will look at the pressure imposed on religious adherents. Had the taxes in
those cases been discriminatory, for instance, the Court could very well have found the existence of a
substantial burden—even in the absence of a theological objection. Cf. generally Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520
(not asking whether there was a substantial burden). This is because the pressure imposed on religious
free exercise would have been substantial.
61. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–76.
62. See Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1805
(advocating this approach). We thank Trenton Van Oss for suggesting the “compliance” and “noncom-
pliance” phrasing.
63. See, e.g., E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam) (“Is the penalty for noncompliance
substantial?”); Korte, 735 F.3d at 682–94; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,
1140–41 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Kaemmerling v. Lap-
pin, 553 F.3d 669, 678–79 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718).
64. 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Exercise Clause Anal-
ysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865, 871 (1989).
65. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
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incompetent to judge religious beliefs.67 Third, both Lyng and RLUIPA say
that religious beliefs need not be “central” to one’s religion for strict scru-
tiny to apply.68 If non-central religious beliefs are protected, then the impor-
tance of the religious belief drops out. To maintain the distinction of “sub-
stantial” from “unsubstantial” burdens, the penalty must therefore be what
is substantial.69 But demonstrating a substantial burden is only one step on
the path to victory for religious claimants. They must somehow invoke
strict scrutiny—the inquiry to which we turn next.
B. Strict Scrutiny “Hook”
There are two ways to invoke strict scrutiny. First, either RFRA or
RLUIPA might apply. Second, following Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,70 the government actor might make an individ-
ualized determination of a religious claim, or otherwise fail to have a neu-
66. Both sides in the recent contraception mandate controversy putatively agree. Compare Catholic
Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 219–26 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom., and
Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam) (agreeing that courts could not gauge religious beliefs, but
holding the challenged requirement did not actually trigger the religiously prohibited conduct), with
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 941–43 (8th Cir. 2015)
vacated and remanded sub nom., and Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (holding the exemption scheme actually
did impose a substantial burden). See also Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Denies Preliminary Injunction
to Wheaton College, 129 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855 n.48 (2016) (discussing circuit split).
67. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How
Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94,
106–09 (2017) (discussing the “Religious-Question Doctrine” and citing authorities). But see Mack v.
O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.), vacated by O’Leary v. Mack, 522 U.S. 801
(1997) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507
(1997)); Marc O. DeGirolami, Substantial Burdens Imply Central Beliefs, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 19,
20–21 (arguing religious beliefs must be considered, at least to some extent).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”); Lyng, 485 U.S. at
457–58.
69. To be sure, this approach is not perfect. Religions often require obedience to civil laws. See,
e.g., Romans 13:1 (English Standard Version) (“Let every person be subject to the governing authori-
ties.”). Although these religions also require following conscience instead of the law, it would be bizarre
if doctrine required religious claimants to be willing to break the law and then said such lawbreaking
was not substantial enough. Following Yoder in addition to Hernandez and Jimmy Swaggart prevents
this perverse outcome.
Moreover, a necessary proviso would be that discriminatory treatment is always a substantial bur-
den. This essentially says that a burden becomes more onerous because it is intentionally applied against
religious actors. Cf. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531 (not asking whether there was a substantial burden); Light-
house Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir. 2002)); Brown v. Borough of
Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849–50 (3d Cir. 1994)); Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 351 (holding that
“arbitrary and capricious” zoning practices are substantial burdens).
70. 508 U.S. 520.
10
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tral and generally applicable policy.71 Courts generally apply RFRA or
RLUIPA before looking at neutrality or generality. This is because “if a
case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.”72 We follow the same sequence.
1. RFRA and RLUIPA
If RFRA or RLUIPA applies, strict scrutiny is available. RFRA applies
to all federal government actions,73 and it is relatively straightforward: if
there is a substantial burden on religion, the government must demonstrate
a compelling governmental interest furthered via the least restrictive
means.74
RLUIPA applies the same way as RFRA in most cases, but it only
extends to institutions (like prisons) and to land use regulations (such as
zoning).75 RLUIPA also says governments may not “treat[ ] a religious as-
sembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly
or institution.”76 The statute’s construction makes clear that a substantial
burden is not required in such cases; discriminatory treatment is enough.77
The crucial inquiry, then, is whether a religious institution has been the
victim of unequal treatment.78 If there is unequal treatment, most circuits
71. See id. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884) (“As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in
which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government ‘may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.’”); id. at 531–32
(“A law failing to satisfy the[ ] requirements [of neutrality and general applicability] must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”).
72. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1025–35 (1994) (dis-
cussing the “last resort” canon).
73. Several cases apply RFRA in bankruptcy cases, where creditors seek to recover religious dona-
tions. See, e.g., In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in
light of City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). But see Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Credi-
tors, 780 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding RFRA did not apply). We do not determine whether
RFRA (or RLUIPA, for that matter) should apply in these quasi-governmental cases.
74. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 439.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking redress in court).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2012). There are other equality and nondiscrimination rules in 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2)–(3) (2012).
77. See Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir.
2011); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 381 (7th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
78. Courts are split on how to define unequal treatment. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1169
n.25 (noting circuit split); see also Andrew Cleves, Comment, Equal Terms: What Does It Mean and
How Does It Work: Interpreting the Equal Terms Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 187 (2011) (same). According to one writer,
“courts have made it very challenging for a plaintiff to successfully establish a prima facie equal terms
11
Wolanek and Liu: Applying Strict Scrutiny
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 12  9-AUG-17 8:24
286 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 78
hold the regulation invalid per se,79 but the Eleventh Circuit requires strict
scrutiny.80
2. Neutrality and Generality
Smith repeatedly emphasized that the laws challenged in that case were
neutral and generally applicable.81 Lukumi made this into a prerequisite (or
at least confirmed its existence as such): if a law fails to be neutral or gener-
ally applicable, it must undergo strict scrutiny.82 Yet courts cannot merely
examine the text of a given law to determine neutrality and generality; a
lawmaker with any degree of political savvy could craft a facially neutral
law that in practice only applied to religious adherents. So under Lukumi, a
law lacks neutrality if its “object,” whether explicitly or implicitly, “is to
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”83
General applicability refers to the law’s breadth: one that only restricts re-
ligiously motivated conduct is not generally applicable.84 Both of these con-
cerns are about “religious gerrymandering.”85 This does not mean that gov-
ernments must write perfectly tailored laws, but that substantial over-
breadth or under-breadth is evidence that the law is actually targeted at
religion.
For instance, Lukumi struck down local ordinances that targeted
Santerı´a, a religion that requires animal sacrifice at important religious
events. The ordinances prohibited “unnecessary” animal killings—but only
when in a ceremony and when the purpose was not consumption.86 Thus,
they permitted activities like deer hunting and kosher slaughter.87 The Court
deemed concerns about public health and animal cruelty overblown because
the law applied even if the sacrifices were performed under sanitary condi-
tions and because the city could have simply prohibited particular methods
violation under RLUIPA.” Bram Alden, Comment, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use
Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users? 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1802 (2010).
79. Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171 n.37; River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse Inst. for
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007).
80. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308
(11th Cir. 2006); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
81. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–81.
82. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32.
83. Id. at 533; see also Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 193–96 (2d Cir. 2014); Stormans, Inc. v. Wiseman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1077
(9th Cir. 2015).
84. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543; see also Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1077–78; Tenafly, 309 F.3d at
165.
85. Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452).
86. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526.
87. Id. at 535–38.
12
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of slaughter.88 This indicated non-neutrality. Similarly, the ordinances were
not generally applicable because they failed to prohibit behavior that impli-
cated the government’s concerns. For instance, they did not prohibit hunters
from bringing their trophies home.89 In the end, the Court concluded the
ordinances were actually aimed at religion—and at Santerı´a in particular.
After Lukumi, “courts have taken a broad view of what it means for a
law to fail the test of neutrality and general applicability.”90 In Fraternal
Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,91 a Muslim officer
wanted to wear a short beard, but the police department had a rule against
facial hair. The department granted medical exemptions, but it denied the
officer’s request for a religious one. This failed under Lukumi. Then-Judge
Alito wrote: “when the government makes a value judgment in favor of
secular motivations, but not religious motivations, the government’s actions
must survive heightened scrutiny.”92 It was discriminatory enough to sim-
ply not give religious justifications the same recognition as secular rea-
sons.93 The policy failed heightened scrutiny for similar reasons: the secular
exemption demonstrated there was not a compelling interest in having
clean-shaven officers.94
C. Compelling Government Interest
Once strict scrutiny is implicated, courts look for a compelling govern-
ment interest. If this requirement “really means what it says,”95 then inter-
ests are compelling only when they are “of the highest order.”96 Classic
88. Id. at 538–39.
89. Id. at 544.
90. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 183. R
91. 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999).
92. Id. at 366.
93. Id. (“[W]hen the government makes a value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not
religious motivations, the government’s actions must survive heightened scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 366. Other cases have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.
Supp. 1540, 1556–58 (D. Neb. 1996). Not all exemptions indicate religious gerrymandering, however.
See, e.g., Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1080–82 (holding that regulation was generally applicable where the
secular exemptions furthered policy goals while the requested religious exemptions frustrated them);
Am. Fam. Ass’n, Inc. v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1156, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding rule neutral and generally
applicable because it did not single out religion).
These differences result from competing approaches to defining neutrality and generality. See
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 143–44 (2009)
(“Some courts have said that all laws are generally applicable unless they were enacted with anti-relig-
ious motive or single out religion for uniquely disadvantageous treatment. Other courts . . . have said
that a law that is generally applicable is a law that applies to everybody. If a law has a secular exception
that undermines its purpose, then it must also have a religious exception—or a compelling reason why
not.”) (citations omitted). It is beyond this Article’s scope to resolve those differences.
95. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
96. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)); see also Brown
v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011) (describing strict scrutiny as requiring a “high degree
13
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examples include preventing “threat[s] to public safety, peace or order.”97
But it is not enough to cite a general interest. The government must instead
demonstrate how its interest would be furthered in that instance.98 And the
policy’s breadth indicates, at least in part, whether the interest is compel-
ling: “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest
order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital inter-
est unprohibited.”99 This is a question of law, but it heavily depends on the
facts of the individual case.100
Numerous articles have argued that Sherbert-era opinions repeatedly
diluted the meaning of “compelling government interest” such that strict
scrutiny appeared more like intermediate scrutiny.101 This can make it diffi-
cult to predict which interests are actually compelling.102 RFRA directly
of necessity”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“paramount interests”); Korte, 735 F.3d at 685–86. But see
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 539, 582 (2015) (arguing for a broad reading of “compelling interest.”).
97. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
98. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431–32; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236. As Gonzales noted, this is similar to
how strict scrutiny is applied elsewhere. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).
99. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment)). But see Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 61 (10th
Cir. 2014) (“A government can rebut an argument from underinclusion by showing that it hasn’t acted in
a logically inconsistent way . . .”).
100. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 949 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.) (“We now
conclude, as other circuits have, that both prongs of RFRA’s strict scrutiny test are legal questions.”).
In the prison context, courts should defer to prison administrators on certain factual questions. See
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (July 27, 2000)
(joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA)); cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126,
132 (2003) (“We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administra-
tors, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and
for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.”). For example, if an inmate wants to
grow a beard but the prison objects on safety grounds, courts should defer to the prison’s safety assess-
ment even though the legal question—whether the safety interest is compelling in that particular in-
stance—is for the courts.
101. Supra note 24; John P. Forren, Revisiting Four Myths About the Peyote Case, 8 U. PA. J. R
CONST. L. 209, 214 (2006); cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “recent decisions reflect the Court’s tendency to relax purportedly
higher standards of review for less-preferred rights.”). Empirical data supports this position. See Win-
kler, supra note 2, at 815, 857–62 (noting government policies survive in 59% of religious liberty cases, R
compared to 22% of free speech cases and 27% of discrimination cases).
But the mere fact that religious claimants lose more often than free speech advocates does not
necessarily mean strict scrutiny is diluted. It might instead be free speech is given “something beyond
strict scrutiny.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring, and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2452 (1996). Or it might be that there are more occasions for
regulating religious conduct than regulating free speech. Finally, the free speech survival rate might be
inflated because certain “low-value” categories of speech (such as fighting words) are unprotected
whereas all religious exercises—no matter how harmful—are examined under the same framework.
102. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222 (1994) (“The compelling interest test has fallen into disarray, especially in the
lower courts.”).
14
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references Sherbert, which implies a narrow definition of “compelling in-
terests.”103 But Lukumi makes no such reference, and the Sherbert-era opin-
ions that arguably weakened the meaning of “compelling” are still good
law. In short, then, compelling government interests are required, but it is
sometimes unclear what that means. The empirical analysis in Part IV of
this Article helps clarify this ambiguity.
D. Least Restrictive Means
At this point in the analysis, the question is not whether the govern-
ment may burden religious exercise. It may. The question is whether the
proposed policy unduly burdens religious exercise.104 This “exceptionally
demanding”105 comparative approach says that if there is a way to achieve
the government’s interest without imposing as great a religious burden, the
chosen policy is not the least restrictive alternative.106 Put differently, the
government cannot “burn the house to roast the pig.”107
RFRA and RLUIPA clearly invoke the least restrictive means require-
ment.108 And despite some confusion on this point, this is the constitutional
requirement. On occasion, the Court has said the Constitution imposes a
“narrow tailoring” requirement.109 But as Justice Ginsburg noted in her
103. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 102, at 224, 226 (arguing RFRA courts should adopt Sher- R
bert’s stringent view of compelling interests).
104. See Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 384 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220).
105. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780).
106. Id. at 864 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529
U.S. 803, 815 (2000)) (internal alterations omitted).
107. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). Put differently still, the government cannot use a
hammer to kill a flea. See THE EMPEROR’S NEW GROOVE (Walt Disney Pictures 2000).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b)(2), 2000cc(a)(1)(B), 2000cc-1(a)(2) (2012).
109. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (stating, without
citation, that pre-Smith cases did not use a least restrictive means test); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F.
Supp. 3d 1160, 1182 (D. Wyo. 2015) (stating the Free Exercise Clause requires narrow tailoring, not the
least restrictive means); Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious
Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 416, 429 (2016) (stating RFRA “had the potential, if read
literally, to be much more restrictive than anything the Court had insisted upon in its pre-Smith jurispru-
dence”). Obviously, RFRA and RLUIPA go further than Sherbert-era jurisprudence to the extent they
require strict scrutiny in prison and military cases. But to mean much, claims that RFRA and RLUIPA
go beyond Sherbert need to assert far more.
Narrow tailoring only requires that the policy be no more extensive than necessary; it does not
require that the policy impose the least burden possible. See Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
810 (1984). “Least restrictive means” is a subset of “narrowly tailored.” See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailor-
ing, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1788–89 (1996) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
280 n.6 (1986)); see also Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 101, at 2422–23 (identifying the “least R
restrictive means” test as a prong of “narrow tailoring,” which also asks whether the interest is actually
furthered and whether the regulation is over-inclusive or under-inclusive).
15
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. dissent,110 pre-Smith cases did invoke
the least restrictive means requirement, sometimes by name. The Hobby
Lobby majority was agnostic about this point for strategic—not doctrinal—
reasons: to show RFRA protected corporations, it argued that “[b]y enacting
RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is constitution-
ally required.”111 The (purported) move from narrow tailoring to least re-
strictive means was given as an example of this shift, but it was an example
the majority was happy to give up if proven incorrect.112 And when Lukumi
struck down the city’s ordinance because the asserted policy goals “could
be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser
degree,”113 the Court was requiring that the city choose the least restrictive
means—despite the mention of narrow tailoring.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This Article rides the coattails of Professor Winkler’s pivotal study on
strict scrutiny, which argued that strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, fatal
in fact.”114 It builds on that study by asking how the government is able to
survive strict scrutiny. This dovetails with the discussion in Part III by
describing how courts actually behave (and not merely what they claim to
do). But this is not an attempt to determine whether Smith made matters
better or worse. That requires analyzing cases before or after Smith. Our
110. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2793 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation and
Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 424 (1999)).
111. Id. at 2767 & n.18 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 2767 n.18.
113. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
114. See generally Winkler, supra note 2. Another article considered how the U.S. Circuit Court of R
Appeals treated religious exemption claims from 1980 to 1990. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith & the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1416–37 (1992).
Our Article differs in substantial respects, however: it considers cases from 1990 to 2015, it includes all
federal courts, and it is more explicitly empirical.
This is not the first empirical study of free exercise cases, but most others have looked at judicial
ideology and decisionmaking. See, e.g., Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion
Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371 (2013);
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morris, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmak-
ing: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004). To the extent
studies did not focus on judicial decision-making, they tended to be limited in scope. See, e.g., Gregory
C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from
the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 251–52 (2012) (finding that Muslim claimants won about
22.2% of cases, compared to the 38.0% success rate for other religions); Amy Adamczyk et al., Relig-
ious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE
237, 239 (2004); John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary’s
Changing Rule in Protecting Minority Religions from Majoritarian Rule, 40 J. SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
RELIGION 427, 433–40 (2001); Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575,
585 (1998) (arguing “RFRA failed to produce any substantial improvement in the legal atmosphere
surrounding religious liberty.”).
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analysis is instead a snapshot that seeks to understand what it takes for the
government to succeed on a free exercise claim.
A. Methodology
To begin, we compiled a list of published federal cases from 1990 to
2015.115 The search term for these cases was intentionally broad, as the goal
was to find every case that mentioned both strict scrutiny and free exer-
cise.116 Running this search term in WestlawNext produced a list of 1,578
cases.
Next, we read each case to determine whether it actually applied strict
scrutiny in the free exercise context. For example, if a case applied strict
scrutiny in a free speech case and then mentioned that the plaintiff’s free
exercise claim was irrelevant, the case was set aside.117 If the court directly
considered the free exercise claim but found there was no substantial bur-
den on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, the case was also set aside (although
we briefly consider trends within these cases in Part IV.A). And if the court
found there was no strict scrutiny “hook” and therefore applied rational
basis under Smith, that case was not considered any further. In each such
instance, the case was simply beyond this Article’s scope, which is only
concerned with how strict scrutiny applies to free exercise cases.
This winnowing process reduced the number of cases to 264.118 These
cases were coded to quantify the following information: date; District, Cir-
cuit, or Supreme Court; geographic region (by Circuit Court); procedural
posture; the strict scrutiny “hook” (if indicated); the asserted government
interest; the outcome of the case; and the court’s reasoning.
115. Technically, we started in April 1990, as we excluded cases decided before Smith.
116. We entered this search term (for published federal opinions) into WestlawNext:
adv: DA(1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015) & “strict scrutiny” “strictest
scrutiny” “exacting scrutiny” ((compelling /2 interest) /s (narrow! “least restrictive”)) & “free
exercise” “religious liberty” “religious freedom” “freedom #of religion”
See Winkler, supra note 2, at 810 n.101 (using a similar search term). We first ran this search in October R
2015. We ran it again in January 2016 to collect opinions issued between October and December 2015.
117. This excluded a number of religious liberty cases that were brought under the free speech
clause. Those cases are quite common. See STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION 58 (2002) (arguing
that “[m]ore than any other constitutional principle, the free speech clause of the First Amendment has
come to characterize the religious liberty efforts” of certain groups); see also Patrick M. Garry, Inequal-
ity Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 384–93 (2004) (criticizing this strategy).
118. Sixteen cases appeared twice in the dataset because of appeals and fourteen cases appear twice
for different motions. Twenty cases appear multiple times, totaling fifty-two observations, because they
have multiple claims that the court analyzed individually.
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION BY COURT
Court n Cases % Total
Supreme Court 4 1.5
Circuit Court 173 65.5
District Court 87 32.0
Geographya n Cases % Total
Supreme Court 4 1.5
First Circuit 9 3.4
Second Circuit 44 16.7
Third Circuit 23 8.7
Fourth Circuit 17 6.4
Fifth Circuit 19 7.2
Sixth Circuit 14 5.3
Seventh Circuit 26 9.9
Eighth Circuit 15 5.7
Ninth Circuit 47 17.8
Tenth Circuit 23 8.7
Eleventh Circuit 11 4.2
D.C. Circuit 12 4.6
Note:
a.
 This is the circuit in which the case was located; not all cases were heard by circuit courts.
Even though no two cases are identical, we needed some way to group
together similar cases. We therefore placed each case into one of eight cate-
gories: prison; nature; bodily integrity; institutions; money; family; proce-
dural; and “other.” The prison category encompasses claims brought by in-
mates. The “nature” category includes cases about the use of natural re-
sources, parks, and the like. “Bodily integrity” includes challenges to
policies that raise concerns about a person’s body—such as challenges to
contraception, health care, and burial. Monetary claims include tax disputes
and bankruptcy proceedings. Institutional claims challenge laws that are ei-
ther enforced by or enacted on behalf of a larger institution. This includes
workplace regulations and school disciplinary proceedings. The “family”
category includes religious objections based on family bonds, namely mar-
riages. Procedural issues include policies that address aspects of the court
system, such as a speedy trial, search and seizure, bail, and parole.
18
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TABLE 2: SECTORS
Sector n Cases % Total
Prison 127 48.1
Nature 21 8.0
Bodily Integrity 45 17.1
Institutional 54 20.5
Money 8 3.0
Family 3 1.1
Procedural 3 1.1
Other 3 1.1
We also needed to categorize the government’s asserted interests. In
doing so, we undoubtedly lost some of the nuance in each asserted interest.
For example, prison safety concerns are different (at least in degree, if not
in kind) in maximum-security prisons than they are in county lockup. Nev-
ertheless, the government’s interests fall into ten general categories: prison
safety and security; public health; gender equality; preserving Native Amer-
ican heritage; land and wildlife preservation; enforcing the Establishment
Clause; enforcing other laws; preserving general operations; public policy;
and protecting groups. Most of these are self-explanatory, but a few demand
explication. “Enforcing other laws” is an asserted interest when the govern-
ment wishes to, for example, prevent fraud and punish drug use.119 “Gen-
eral operations” is a pragmatic government concern that accounts for gen-
eral public safety, traffic safety, cost minimization, and economic develop-
ment.120 “Public policy” is obviously amorphous and depends on the
context of the case, but it is invoked when the government wishes to ad-
vance an abstract public policy not delineated by statute.121 This includes
preventing litigation and maintaining order and discipline in the schools.
Finally, “protecting groups” is the asserted interest when the government
119. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 585 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[T]he Government
unquestionably has a compelling interest in uniformly applying kidnapping laws to prevent serious
crimes of violence”); Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (D. Utah 2005), vacated for lack
of standing, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he State of Utah has a compelling state interest in
banning plural marriage”).
120. See, e.g., Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 2013) (ac-
cepting prison’s asserted interest in prison administration); McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636,
651 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding question of material fact existed as to whether “traffic safety” was compel-
ling as applied); Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (re-
jecting asserted interest in a uniform workforce).
121. See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 268 (5th Cir.
2010) (holding school district’s asserted interest in enforcing its grooming policy—including related
concerns about hygiene and classroom order—was not compelling); Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F. Supp.
2d 400, 412 (D. Mass. 2008) (accepting asserted interest in prisoner rehabilitation in addition to interest
in prison order); Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 516 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting, as applied, asserted interest in preventing age discrimination).
19
Wolanek and Liu: Applying Strict Scrutiny
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-AUG-17 8:24
294 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 78
seeks to further the well-being of particular constituencies, such as the
homeless, minors, and employees.122
TABLE 3: ASSERTED INTERESTS
Asserted Interest n Casesa % Total
None asserted 28 10.6
Prison safety and security 99 37.5
Public health 50 18.9
Gender equality 30 11.4
Preserving Native American heritage 7 2.7
Land and wildlife preservation 17 6.4
Enforcing the Establishment Clause 7 2.7
Enforcing other laws 28 10.6
General operations 73 27.7
Public policy 18 6.8
Protecting groups 9 3.4
Note:
a.
 The number of cases is greater than n=264, as several cases may assert multiple interests.
We distinguished between seven religion categories: Christianity, Ju-
daism, Islam, Rastafarianism, Sikhism, Native American religions, and
Other (which includes Buddhism, Wicca, Santeria, and Odinism). These
categories are broad and do not reflect denominational differences, much
less the fact that there is no single “Native American religion.” Still, it
draws the necessary distinctions between the largest religions. Groups in the
“other” category simply do not bring enough cases to be represented as
individual religions.
TABLE 4: RELIGIONS
Sector n Cases % Total
Christianity 87 33.0
Judaism 20 7.6
Islam 41 15.5
Rastafarianism 10 3.8
Sikhism 11 4.2
Native American 46 17.4
Other 49 18.6
Unlike many other empirical studies, we account for procedural pos-
ture. This is because surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is a very different outcome than securing a motion for summary judg-
ment. We therefore noted whether the government was the plaintiff or de-
122. See, e.g., Listecki, 780 F.3d at 745 (“The Committee’s asserted compelling governmental inter-
est is the protection of creditors”); Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 576 (noting the city
asserted an interest in ensuring the homeless slept in shelters).
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fendant; whether the opinion followed a motion to dismiss,123 a motion for
a pre-trial injunction,124 or a decision on the merits (including a motion for
summary judgment);125 and whether the decision was on appeal.
TABLE 5: PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Government’s Role n Cases % Total
Plaintiff 15 5.7
Defendant 240 90.9
Neither a 9 3.4
Appeals n Cases % Total
Yes 88 33.3
By plaintiff 58 22.0
By defendant 29 11.0
Cross-appeal 1 0.0
No 176 66.3
Motionsb n Cases % Total
Preliminary Injunction 58 22.0
Motion to Dismiss 22 8.3
Summary Judgment 131 49.6
Notes:
a.
 These are typically bankruptcy cases.
b.
 Motions filed by either the Plaintiff or the Defendant. Not all motions are covered, such
that the number of motions is less than N = 264.
With this dataset in hand, we can trace each prong of the strict scrutiny
analysis discussed in Part III. In each subpart, we first look at the summary
statistics related to that stage. After that, we gauge the likelihood of suc-
ceeding on a free exercise claim under different factors in that stage. We
generally find the following:
TABLE 6: SUCCESS RATE
Prevailing Party n Cases % Total=fn
Plaintiff 177 67.1
Defendant 68 25.8
Question of fact unresolved 19 7.2
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). Most of these were motions under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46
(1957).
124. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)–(b); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986).
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B. Substantial Burden
Because religious burdens are specific to a religion, we first look to
whether there may be significant differences in success rates across burdens
and religion. Although this Article is generally only concerned with those
cases that pass the substantial burden threshold, we did collect data for
those cases in which the court discussed strict scrutiny but ultimately de-
cided there was no substantial burden. We speculate that these are border-
line cases: if the absence of a substantial burden had been obvious, no dis-
cussion of strict scrutiny would have been needed. The court is therefore
looking at strict scrutiny in order to cover its bases and guarantee the legiti-
macy of its decisions. We found 45 such cases. The plurality related to
prison policies (n=16) and to Christianity (n=18).
Table 7 shows the differences between these borderline cases and
cases that pass the substantial burden test, using a two-sample z-test. This is
a statistical test that incorporates information about the sample size and
standard error of the sample to test whether the difference in proportions
between two groups is statistically significant. Here, we examine whether
those cases that pass the substantial burdens test, compared to those that do
not pass, might differ along case characteristics.126 We found significant
differences in several domains. Reassuringly, there are significant differ-
ences in whether or not the policy is the least restrictive means. Presuma-
bly, the vast majority of cases underlying those non-substantial burden
cases should have policies that are the least restrictive means (n = 33). In-
deed, this statistic demonstrates the relationship between the scope of the
policy and the extent of the perceived burden, in turn suggesting that sub-
stantial burdens are more about the cost of noncompliance than the central-
ity of belief.
Similarly, there are significant differences in the discussion of compel-
ling interests. Eighty percent of the non-substantial burden cases are found
to have a compelling interest, but that number drops to 43% among the
substantial burden cases. Additionally, there are significant differences in
the proportion of cases at the motion to dismiss stage or in cases that are
appeals. This makes sense because having a non-substantial burden might
be grounds for dismissal if there are no additional causes of action. Alto-
gether, the outcome for defendants is less favorable under strict scrutiny:
when a substantial burden is not found, defendants ultimately succeed on
their motion (or defeat plaintiff’s motion) in 78% of the claims in our
dataset, compared to 26% of victories that successfully pass this first stage
of free exercise. Similarly, the government’s interest is deemed compelling
126. See ROXY PECK, CHRIS OLSEN & JAY L. DEVORE, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS AND DATA
ANALYSIS 594–99 (5th ed. 2015).
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in 80% of cases without a substantial burden, compared to 43% where there
is a substantial burden.127
TABLE 7: SUBSTANTIAL VS. UNSUBSTANTIAL BURDENS
Substantial Burden No Substantial Burden
n Cases % Total n Cases % Total
Overall 264 100 45 100
Motions
Prelim. Injunction 56 21.2 3 6.7
Motion to Dismiss 20 7.6 13 28.9***
Summary Judgment 131 49.6 21 46.7
Religion
Christianity 87 33.0 18 40.0
Judaism 20 7.6 5 11.1
Islam 41 15.5 8 17.8
Rastafarianism 10 3.8 0 0.0
Sikhism 11 4.2 0 0.0
Native American 46 17.4 5 11.1
Other 49 18.6 9 20.0
Appeals
Yes 88 33.3 8 17.8*
By plaintiff 58 22.0 6 13.3
By defendant 29 11.0 1 0.2
Cross-appeal 1 0.0 1 0.2
No 176 66.7 37 82.2*
Prevailing Party
Plaintiff 177 67.0 10 22.2***
Defendant 68 25.8 35 77.8***
Question of fact unresolved 19 7.2 0 0.0
Compelling Interest
Yes 114 43.2 36 80.0***
Not as presented 120 45.5 5 11.1***
Never compelling 30 11.4 4 8.9
Least Restrictive Means
Yes 54 20.5 33 73.3***
No 86 32.6 3 6.7***
Question of fact unresolved 38 14.4 3 6.3
Not reached 86 32.6 6 13.3***
Note: * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.
127. The challenged policies are also more likely to be found to be the least restrictive means. This
demonstrates a hesitation to say that a burden on a religious belief is insubstantial.
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These cases are borderline for a reason. It could very well be that cases
that are immediately dismissed because of their insubstantial burden on re-
ligious exercise have different demographics.
We turn now exclusively to the subset of cases in which burdens have
been deemed substantial (n = 264). As seen above in Table 2, the plurality
of these cases are prison related (48%), followed by institutional pressures
on free exercise, such as zoning or education (21%). And as seen in Table
4, the plurality of cases relates to Christianity (33%), followed by other
religions (19%) and Islam (17%).
C. Compelling Government Interests
Table 8 shows the “success rate” of asserted compelling interests
among various categories—that is, the percentage of cases where the policy
appears to further a compelling interest. Based on summary statistics of
success rates alone, there appears to be a variety of success rates based on
the category of the compelling interest stated and the sector of the case. For
instance, cases relating to nature (namely wildlife and national parks) have
a 76% compelling interest success rate, whereas cases relating to bodily
integrity (for example, contraception and autopsy cases) have a 20% suc-
cess rate. Similarly, when the government states that its compelling interest
is land/wildlife preservation, it has a 77% success rate, but when it claims a
compelling interest in public health, that success rate drops to 38%.128
To test the statistical validity of these differences, we followed up with
a logistic regression analysis with the statistical software STATA, into
which the variables in Table 2 were entered. A logistic regression allows us
to determine what variables (here, case characteristics) might help to deter-
mine a dichotomous outcome (here, whether the stated interest is found
compelling or not).129 Each of the categories was compared to the baseline
model, which was set as a prison case impacting Christianity, but with no
stated compelling interest.130 We chose this model because it was the type
of case that most frequently appeared in our dataset.
128. Note that these rates are not identical because a case involving nature, for example, may not
necessarily name land or wildlife preservation as a compelling interest, although it often does. For
example, in one case the government cited complying with the multi-use mandate for national parks,
ensuring parkgoers’ safety, and avoiding an Establishment Clause violation as reasons to use artificial
snow made from treated sewage on a ski area atop a sacred mountain. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at
1044–46.
129. See JEREMY J. FOSTER, EMMA BARKUS & CHRISTIAN YAVORSKY, UNDERSTANDING AND USING
ADVANCED STATISTICS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 57–58 (2006).
130. With regard to overfitting concerns, we tested subsets of variables (for example, sector only,
compelling interest only) and found that results were similar to the full model. Due to this concern, we
hesitate to interpret the odds ratios and focus our discussion on the significance of each factor only.
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TABLE 8: COMPELLING INTERESTS
Compelling Interest Logistic Regression
Standard
n Cases % Total Odds Ratio Error
Overallb 245
Criminal Case
Yes (n = 14) 11 78.6 6.8 7.2
No (n = 250) 103 41.2
RFRA
Yes (n = 116) 59 50.9 1.6 1.0*
No (n = 148) 55 37.2
RLUIPA
Yes (n = 107) 43 40.2 0.9 0.6
No (n = 157) 71 45.2
Lukumi
Yes (n = 22) 5 22.7 0.3 0.3
No (n = 240) 109 45.4
Question of fact unresolved 0 0.0
(n = 2)
Sector
Prison (n = 127) 66 52.0
Nature (n = 21) 16 76.2 1.0 1.0
Bodily Integrity (n = 45) 20 20.0 0.1 0.1***
Institutional (n = 54) 11 20.4 0.2 0.1*
Money (n = 8) 4 50.0 0.4 0.6
Family (n = 3)b 3 100.0
Procedural (n = 3)b 2 100.0
Other (n = 3) 2 66.7 9.8 16.5
Religion
Christianity (n = 87) 24 27.3
Judaism (n = 20) 7 35.0 0.4 0.3
Islam (n = 41) 20 48.8 1.3 0.8
Rastafarian (n = 10) 6 60.0 .9 .8
Sikh (n = 11)b 11 100.0
Native American (n = 46) 31 67.4 1.5 0.9
Other (n = 49) 27 55.1 1.8 1.0
Asserted Interest
No asserted interest (n = 2 7.1
28)
Prison safety and security 56 56.6 55 69***
(n = 99)
Public health (n = 50)b c 19 38.0
Gender equality (n = 30)c 8 26.7
Preserving Native 6 85.7
American heritage (n = 7)b
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Land and wildlife 13 76.5 109 212*
preservation (n = 17)
Enforcing Establishment 2 28.6 81 134**
Clause (n = 7)
Enforcing other laws (n = 13 46.4 103 145***
28)
General operations (n = 34 46.6 56 74**
73)
Public policy (n = 18) 8 44.4 55 80**
Protecting groups (n = 9) 4 44.4 85 167*
Multiple interests (n=93)b 45 48.4 88 112***
Notes:
a.
 * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at .1%
b.
 The logistic regression predicted outcomes perfectly here; because of this, the software
dropped these automatically from the logistic regression analysis.
c.
 Because of the nature of the logistic regression analysis, cases with multiple asserted
interests were grouped separately. This led to, for example, public health not being
represented in the logistical analysis because it was always grouped together with another
variable.
We found that the odds of having a compelling interest are higher in
cases invoking RFRA, but policies in the institutional sector are more likely
to fail the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny. Regarding articulated
compelling interests, a court finds nearly anything more favorable than not
stating one at all (our baseline), as we should expect. As a follow-up, we
conducted another analysis (not shown) where the baseline model was the
same—a prison case impacting Christianity—except that the stated compel-
ling interest was “prison safety and security.” Under this logistic regression,
the only statistically significant stated compelling interest was “no interest
stated,” reiterating that compelling interests must remain relevant to the sec-
tor under which the claim is being brought.
Finally, the model perfectly predicted success rates for cases in the
family and procedural sectors, for cases involving the Sikh faith, and cases
in which the compelling interest was public health, gender equality, or pre-
serving Native American heritage. This suggests that the odds of success
are either very high or very low—that is, these factors either predict that the
policy will pass or fail the compelling interest prong. As seen in Table 8,
courts find a compelling interest for all of the family, procedural, and Sikh
cases in our dataset. But this is less clear for the other compelling interests
stated. In our dataset, we find that public health and gender equality are
nearly always bound together in cases involving contraception funding, and
that that is often an insufficiently compelling interest for the court.131 Simi-
larly, preserving Native American heritage does not appear to be an interest
131. See, e.g., Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other
grounds, Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557.
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that stands on its own—it is always bound with other interests, most often
wildlife preservation.132 Given that stating multiple interests is generally
more likely to yield success on the compelling interest prong, this may ex-
plain why the majority of cases citing Native American heritage pass the
compelling interest prong.
D. Least Restrictive Means
After a policy passes the compelling interest prong, courts look to the
least restrictive means prong. Like Table 8, Table 9 shows the “success
rate” of least restrictive means justifications. Here, however, the rate is con-
ditional on having passed the compelling interest analysis. Again, there ap-
pear to be differences by criminal case status, sector, and even religion at
this stage. But because significantly fewer cases pass the compelling inter-
est analysis (n = 107) and the least restrictive means prong, we are limited
in our statistical ability to appropriately analyze whether specific sectors,
religions, or compelling interests have particularly high success rates.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695 (M.D. Tenn. 2006); United
States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Or. 1996).
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TABLE 9: COMPELLING INTEREST & LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
n Cases % of n
Overall 114
Criminal Case
Yes (n = 11) 8 72.7
No (n = 103) 46 44.7
RFRA
Yes (n = 59) 30 50.9
No (n = 55) 24 43.6
RLUIPA
Yes (n = 43) 17 39.5
No (n = 71) 37 52.1
Lukumi
Yes (n = 5) 1 20.0
No (n = 109) 53 48.6
Sector
Prison (n = 66) 31 47.0
Nature (n = 16) 10 62.5
Bodily Integrity (n = 9) 0 0.0
Institutional (n = 11) 6 54.6
Money (n = 4) 3 75.0
Family (n = 3) 2 66.7
Procedural (n = 3) 2 66.7
Other (n = 2) 0 0.0
Religion
Christianity (n = 24) 8 33.3
Judaism (n = 7) 4 57.0
Islam (n = 20) 5 25.0
Rastafarian (n = 6) 5 83.3
Sikh (n = 0) 0 0.0
Native American (n = 31) 17 53.3
Other (n = 27) 15 52.2
Asserted Interest
No asserted interest (n = 2) 1 50.0
Prison safety and security (n = 56) 23 41.1
Public health (n = 19) 8 42.1
Gender equality (n = 8) 1 12.5
Preserving Native American heritage (n =
6) 2 33.3
Land/wildlife preservation (n = 13) 9 69.2
Enforcing Establishment Clause (n = 2) 2 100.0
Enforcing other laws (n = 13) 10 76.9
General operations (n = 34) 15 44.1
Public policy (n = 8) 3 37.5
Protecting groups (n = 4) 2 50.0
Multiple Interests (n = 45) a 19 42.2
Notes:
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%, *** Significant at .1%
a
. Includes outcomes from cases analyzed in other compelling interests.
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Still, some of the summary statistics are of particular interest. For in-
stance, even though cases that cite upholding the Establishment Clause have
a 29% success rate on the compelling interest prong, if a case passes that
threshold, they are likely to find success on least restrictive means and on
strict scrutiny more broadly. Looking to the two cases that pass strict scru-
tiny because of the Establishment Clause, however, it appears that the cases
have unusual facts and unsympathetic plaintiffs. One plaintiff was a teacher
fired due to frequent classroom proselytizing,133 and the other was a student
who wanted his public school district to pay for his Catholic school transla-
tor.134 This suggests that the Establishment Clause is an otherwise weak
interest for the government to cite.
By contrast, though public policy cases have a 70% success rate as a
compelling interest, they only have a 14% success rate when examined for
least restrictive means. The only case that succeeded under this scenario is
Combs v. Homer Center School District,135 where the plaintiffs homes-
chooled their children but refused to turn in a curriculum for review by the
district.
E. Discussion
The upshot of our research is that strict scrutiny at least appears to be
strict.136 As with any quantitative analysis, we are cautious given the small
133. See Helland v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1996).
134. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other
grounds, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
135. 468 F. Supp. 2d 738, 739–40 (W.D. Pa. 2006). The strict scrutiny analysis was tied in with a
discussion of hybrid rights, but the court also considered free exercise standing alone. See Combs, 468 F.
Supp. 2d at 776–77.
136. As previously mentioned, we take our lead from Professor Winkler’s 2006 article. We followed
his methodology in many respects. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 809–12 (describing the methodology). R
Winkler found that religious claimants only win strict scrutiny cases 41% of the time. Id. at 815.
Our data tells a different story: religious claimants win much more often than Winkler reports. This
difference may be explained in several ways. First, and most simply, we have more cases: 264 compared
to 73. See id. at 857. Second, Winkler looked at cases from 1990 to 2003; our data spans 1990 to 2015.
Winker wrote that strict scrutiny was “apparently becoming more fatal” as the years passed by, and we
could expect that trend to continue. Id. at 824–25.
Finally, we did not follow his methodology in every respect. For example, he excluded both prelim-
inary injunction cases and “decisions that were subsequently reversed or affirmed on appeal.” Id. at 811.
We included all of these cases, and Winkler’s decision to exclude them is subject to question. He
ignores that preliminary injunctions are an essential litigation strategy. Secure the injunction, and the
case might settle. By excluding these cases, Winkler focuses only on cases that are so contested that
parties do not relent. His decision to exclude affirmed cases obscures the fact that two separate panels
reached the same conclusion. Litigants could—and do—cite both opinions, so it makes little sense to
ignore the lower opinion. Finally, although on first thought one might choose to exclude reversed cases,
that decision obscures what judges actually do. This Article attempts to discern how judges actually
apply strict scrutiny. From this perspective, it makes little sense to exclude a district court merits deci-
sion simply because a circuit court thought there was a question of fact precluding summary judgment.
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number of cases we have.137 Nevertheless, Table 10 gives the most compre-
hensive and precise analysis of free exercise strict scrutiny cases to date.
Specifically, it shows the likelihood of plaintiff success at each stage of
litigation. In the end, religious claimants win a significant number of their
cases. This is particularly true in two situations. First, the government rarely
wins when the court faces a motion for a preliminary injunction. This shows
that the religious claimant starts out on top—the government truly bears the
burden of proof. Second, and more significantly, when religious claimants
are able to demonstrate that a law lacks neutrality, or that it is not generally
applicable, they win almost every time. The government has only once suc-
cessfully articulated a compelling interest furthered by the least restrictive
means when the law lacked generality or neutrality.138 This is reminiscent
of free speech jurisprudence,139 where content-based regulations almost
never survive, but where content-neutral regulations might.140
But what underlies these statistics? The high success rate is not the
product of particularly robust review based on affection for religious liberty
but is instead a product of historical accident and government ineptitude.
That is, government interests are theoretically compelling but uncertain in
their application. Consider two aspects: why the government loses on the
compelling interest prong of the analysis, and what it takes to qualify an
interest as compelling.
First, when the government’s asserted interest is deemed non-compel-
ling, it is usually because the government’s interest is found not compelling
After all, on remand the district judge may issue the same opinion. Similarly, decisions that were va-
cated after City of Boerne are presumably still helpful guides to applying strict scrutiny.
137. It is difficult to establish causality with the few cases that pass both prongs of strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, to our knowledge, this is the first quantitative analysis of its kind in the post-Smith era.
138. See Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “protecting against terror-
ism” allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to single out a group of Muslim men for heightened
security screening). Professor Winkler found similar results. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 861. This is R
not to say Lukumi is a silver bullet. The law must first be found non-neutral or not generally applica-
ble—and that is where the real battle occurs. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32.
139. See Volokh, Religious Exemptions, supra note 24, at 1505, 1508 (comparing certain forms of R
religious discrimination with content-based speech restrictions).
140. Restrictions on free speech come in two flavors. “The first form of abridgement may be sum-
marized as encompassing government actions aimed at communicative impact; the second, as encom-
passing government actions aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects
on communicative opportunity.” TRIBE, supra note 22, at 790. The first is “presumptively at odds with R
the first amendment” and requires strict scrutiny. Id. The second is not presumptively invalid, but the
Court “requires a ‘thumb’ on the scale to assure that the balance struck in any particular situation
properly reflects the central position of free expression in the constitutional scheme.” Id. at 791. There-
fore, an ordinance differentiating between “political,” “ideological,” and “directional” signs requires
strict scrutiny. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27. But a blanket ban on all signs in public right-of-ways is
on subject to intermediate scrutiny. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
817 (1984).
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as applied.141 That is, courts often admit (at least implicitly) that the case
could have come out differently had the government’s interest been more
directly at stake. Put differently, courts almost never say that an interest
could never be compelling.142 When they do take that step, it is usually
because the government failed to assert any interest.143 The judiciary’s will-
ingness to find an interest theoretically compelling means that more specific
interests have a better chance of prevailing. For example, prison administra-
tors are frequently told their interests are not compelling even while game
wardens are told their interest in protecting the bald eagle population is
compelling: in the former situation, the prison likely asserted a broad inter-
est without stopping to develop the facts behind; in the latter situation, the
interest is inherently and obviously specific.
To be sure, courts will sometimes flat-out reject an asserted interest,144
and the government will inevitably assert an interest unsupported by the
facts. Yet when courts invalidate interests only as applied, they concede that
the interest is (abstractly speaking) strong enough to overcome religious
objections. In this way, the compelling interest prong is like the least re-
strictive means prong—if the government had articulated its interests more
precisely, or if it had developed a more complete record, the result might
have been different. This problem is especially acute in RFRA and
141. The government’s asserted interest is found “not compelling as presented” in 45.5% of cases,
compared to “never compelling” in 11% of cases. Supra Table 7; see also Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410,
415 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where a circuit court has found that a state’s identified interest was insufficiently
compelling, this was often based on the court’s observation that the state failed to provide sufficient
evidence explaining how the practices at issue furthered the stated interest”) (discussing prison cases).
142. See supra Table 7.
143. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) (“One can imagine that a
prison official could supply [a government interest] (time constraints, the cost of personnel, etc.), but we
are provided with none.”); Irshad Learning Ctr. v. Cnty. of Dupage, 937 F. Supp. 2d 910, 948 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“The County has not argued that its decision . . . was justified by a compelling government
interest.”); Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632 (W.D. Va. 2002) (stating the government
“presented no governmental interest—compelling or otherwise”); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of
Zoning Adjust., 862 F. Supp. 538, 545–46 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting the government conceded that it had
no compelling interest).
Of course, the government has also occasionally stated interests that were deemed insufficient as a
matter of law. See, e.g., In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that furthering “the
interests advanced by the bankruptcy system are not compelling under the RFRA,” and therefore that
tithes were protected from recovery in bankruptcy proceedings), vacated sub nom. Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in
light of City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1175 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that the county’s
asserted interests in preserving the current zoning system, “although legitimate in many senses, [did] not
constitute compelling governmental interest.”).
144. For example, there could never be a compelling interest in merely following a state statute:
“Allowing state actors to escape liability by claiming that they have a ‘compelling state interest’ in
implementing a state law that violates federal law [i.e., RFRA] would make the Supremacy Clause
hollow indeed.” Bessard v. Cal. Cmty. Colls., 867 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
31
Wolanek and Liu: Applying Strict Scrutiny
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 32  9-AUG-17 8:24
306 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 78
RLUIPA cases, where the “common-law approach” is particularly vulnera-
ble to judicial reversals.145
This leads to the second indication that the review is not robust: the
definition of a “compelling interest.” Not all compelling interests are cre-
ated equal. Some reflect existential threats.146 Other interests are still
strong, but they represent something more like a desire to further policy
goals (instead of avoiding a constitutional crisis). And as public policy
changes, so too will the outcome of free exercise cases.147 For example,
five justices recently wrote that ensuring cost-free access to contraceptives
is a compelling government interest,148 but the right to access contracep-
tives is of relatively recent vintage.149 When Indiana enacted a Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the backlash150 assumed that nondiscrimination
145. See Volokh, Religious Exemptions, supra note 24, at 1488 (“A court might grant an exception R
based on its tentative conclusion that the exemption . . . won’t do much harm to the government interest;
but a few years later, after evaluating the exemption in action, the court might change its view.”).
146. See Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming that prison security is a
compelling interest); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (“Everyone agrees
that the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.”) (free
speech case).
147. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 1159, 1209 (2013) (“[A]s a society changes from a liberal religious society to a modern (or post-
modern) irreligious society, intuitions shift too as to what are sufficiently compelling interests to trump
religious exercise”); see also Yuval Levin, The Perils of Religious Liberty, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2016, at
29, 33 (arguing “the compulsive state religion, or at least our new civil religion, is supposed to be
progressive liberalism.”). This change in religious affiliation can be seen in the increasing number of
Americans who claim no religious affiliation. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICA’S CHANGING RE-
LIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 4 (May 12, 2015) (reporting that 22.8% of Americans in 2014 were atheist, agnos-
tic, or “nothing in particular”—up from 16.1% in 2007).
148. In Hobby Lobby, both Justice Kennedy (in a concurring opinion) and Justice Ginsburg (in a
dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) wrote that access to contraception is a com-
pelling interest. 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is important to confirm that a premise
of the Court’s opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and
compelling interest in the health of female employees”); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Government has shown that the contraceptive coverage for which the ACA provides
furthers compelling interests in public health and women’s well-being. Those interests are concrete,
specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence.”). Even the majority could not conclu-
sively reject “guaranteeing cost-free access to . . . contraceptive methods” as a compelling interest. See
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. But see Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1269,
1276 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (concluding the Kennedy and Ginsburg opinions did not conclusively find this
interest compelling).
149. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977) (plurality) (invalidating a ban on
distributing contraceptives to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (same for unmar-
ried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (same for married couples).
150. See, e.g., Rick Ungar, Understanding Why Indiana’s RFRA Clears The Way To Discriminating
Against LGBT Americans, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:51 P.M.), https://perma.cc/L3CR-X5RJ; Michael
Barbaro & Erik Eckholm, Right to Deny Service to Gays Stirs Broad Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2015, at A1.
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would not be considered a compelling government interest.151 But one state
representative offered an amendment that would have made “preventing
discrimination” a compelling interest,152 and a court could easily find that
interest compelling even without a statutory hook.153 Indeed, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights recently promoted this view.154 Tying
acceptable interests to public opinion will likely assuage those concerns (as-
suming cultural mores develop along their current path), but it should ter-
rify religious claimants who had otherwise planned to take refuge behind
state RFRAs. The more those interests are recognized as being “of the high-
est order,” and the less important we deem religious liberty, the fewer relig-
ious exceptions will be favored.155
In the end, it seems that Smith’s central concern—avoiding anarchy—
will prove unfounded. Religious claimants will only be given the right to
ignore laws that the political culture believes can be ignored. And this will
not dilute “compelling” interests because that concern assumes there is a
fixed meaning of what is “compelling.” Instead, courts will recognize new
interests that they sincerely believe are bona fide compelling interests. But
in doing so, it seems that something important about religious liberty—its
protection for minority interests—will be lost.
151. See Jonathan Cohn, Why Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law Is Such A Big Deal, THE HUF-
FINGTON POST (updated Apr. 2, 2015), http://perma.cc/8GH9-LPXC (noting that the impact of Indiana’s
RFRA depends, in part, on the definition of “compelling interest”).
152. Andrew Koppleman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidis-
crimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 636 (2015) (citing H. Amend. 5 to S.B. 101, 119th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015)).
153. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (finding a “compelling interest in eradi-
cating discrimination against . . . female citizens”); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (stating that “the
Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education”);
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 860 n.4 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (stating there is a
“compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.”).
Bob Jones is the most applicable precedent, but it emphasized the special status of racial discrimi-
nation in education. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595 (“Few social or political issues in our history
have been more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimina-
tion, particularly in education.”). It could therefore be distinguished on those lines, but that distinction is
not likely to stick given that many compare protections for religious claimants to Jim Crow laws. See,
e.g., Adam Winkler, Will the Supreme Court License Anti-Gay Discrimination?, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 24, 2014 9:28 A.M.), http://perma.cc/5FEA-SM59 (“We’re already seeing a spate of proposals at
the state level for Jim Crow-like laws that would permit discrimination against LGBT people.”).
154. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINA-
TION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 25, at 25–27 (September 2016), available at https://perma.cc/
8ANP-ZTTY (asserting that religious exemptions to nondiscrimination statutes “significantly infringe
upon . . . civil rights” and that RFRAs should be amended or interpreted to ensure they do not “unduly
burden civil liberties and civil rights protections against status-based discrimination”); id. at 26, availa-
ble at https://perma.cc/8ANP-ZTTY (“Overly broad religious exeptions unduly burden nondiscrimina-
tion laws and policies.”).
155. Cf. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 170 (2014) (“The con-
sensus in favor of accommodation of religion . . . seems to have weakened, if not collapsed.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
How to properly regulate religious activity has been a long and conten-
tious struggle. Even though Smith eliminated strict scrutiny for neutral and
generally applicable laws, Lukumi (along with RFRA and RLUIPA) revived
it. Despite Smith’s concerns, therefore, courts still often require the govern-
ment to demonstrate a compelling interest furthered through the least re-
strictive means.
We looked at what characteristics allow free exercise claims through
each prong of strict scrutiny: substantial burden, compelling interest, and
least restrictive means. We found that a majority (78%) of cases with free
exercise claims succeed on a motion or judgment if they pass the substantial
burden test, as opposed to 26% if they do not. This jump in success rates
suggests that the substantial burden test may be the tallest hurdle in this
process. But there appear to be few differences in the relative distribution of
sectors, religion, and compelling interest between cases that passed or failed
the substantial burden test. This suggests that, for the most part, no set of
facts is more sympathetic to judges.156
Whether a law passes the compelling interest and least restrictive
means prongs varies on the type of case and the issues addressed. Though
that seems obvious, our dataset allowed us to see what cases have been
most represented at each step. Prison-related cases—in which the govern-
ment invokes prison safety and security as a concern—make up the plural-
ity of cases represented in a compelling interest analysis. But the sectors
and interests that passed the compelling interest test at the highest rates (for
example, family and procedural sectors, or preserving Native American her-
itage) were relatively small. This suggests that success turns on the facts of
the individual case. Yet the compelling interest and least restrictive means
prongs do not always run together. Moreover, courts usually defer to the
religious claimant when a question of fact is presented, allowing the case to
continue.
This area is ripe for future research. Although we limited our scope to
religious liberty and free exercise, it is likely that the standards set by the
court may spill over into other areas—particularly in cases with hybrid
claims. Similarly, some are hesitant to apply strict scrutiny in free exercise
cases because it might weaken strict scrutiny elsewhere.157 A comprehen-
156. Note, however, that the stated interest of “preserving Native American heritage” represented a
statistically higher proportion of cases rejected on substantial burden grounds relative to other interests.
157. See Volokh, Religious Exemptions, supra note 24, at 1500. R
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sive study of other contexts, such as free speech, is needed before the truth
of this claim can be determined.158
The use of strict scrutiny has been well documented in other domains,
but occasionally that means statements about strict scrutiny are distilled into
catchall analyses and flowcharts. Yet as we see here, strict scrutiny is tai-
lored to the facts. Government can—and does—win cases against religious
claimants. But when it does win, it does so only in the instant case. Put
simply, strict scrutiny makes the government prove its case in every case.159
For that reason, it is a valuable and necessary protection for religious lib-
erty. The current approach to strict scrutiny is precariously tied to popular
opinion and government formulations, however, meaning that the outcome
of cases may very well change in the near future.
158. See Lund, Perspective, supra note 6, at 299 n.62 (doubting the existence of such evidence). R
This study should specially consider the role of religious speech cases. See supra note 109. R
159. See Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A synthesis of the [compelling
interest and least restrictive means] prongs is . . . the question whether the government has a compelling
interest in not exempting a religious individual from a particular regulation.”) (emphasis added).
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